War Veteran\u27s Policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina by Nikolina Obradović
93
Č L A N C I
*  Nikolina Obradović, Filozofski fakultet Sveučilišta u Mostaru / Faculty of Philosophy, University of Mostar, 
Matice hrvatske b.b., 88000 Mostar, Bosna i Hercegovina / Bosnia and Herzegovina, 686nika@gmail.com
War Veteran’s Policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina
NIKOLINA OBRADOVIĆ* Pregledni rad
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Mostar UDK: 364.65-058.66
Mostar, Bosnia and Herzegovina  doi: 10.3935/rsp.v24i1.1367
  Primljeno: siječanj 2016.
The paper addresses the implications of war veteran benefits on social po-
licy and fiscal sustainability in one of the two B&H entities, the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The author attempts to address changes over time 
and relate these to the process of demilitarisation, as well as the influence 
and pressures exerted by war veteran associations, which resulted in policies 
favourable to certain war veteran groups, often at the expense of other bene-
ficiaries and the system’s long term sustainability. Social policy and war vete-
ran legislation in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is status based, 
which provides scope for considerable discretion by government officials in 
deciding where to allocate funds. This, in turn, is destabilising public finan-
ces, while little is being done to address poverty alleviation.
Key words: war veterans, social protection, privileged pensions, Federa-
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INTRODUCTION
Today’s Bosnia and Herzegovina is a 
complex state with a decentralised admin-
istrative government structure, designed as 
part of the Dayton Peace Agreement signed 
in Dayton, Ohio in 1995. Dayton ended a 
four year conflict that had elements of both 
civil war and foreign aggression. Accord-
ing to Pietz (2004: 15) during the war more 
than 425,000 people, mostly men, were 
mobilised into different military forces, 
organised mainly on ethnic and politi-
cal grounds. The war caused considerable 
material and human destruction. Although 
the conflict inevitably disrupted the routine 
business of public administration, the vari-
ous warring factions did manage to keep 
some records of their members, including 
those wounded and killed. This will serve as 
the main evidence for gaining war veteran 
status after the war. In fact, the first benefits 
to family members of deceased fallen sol-
diers were given during the conflict years. 
However, the wartime records were incom-
plete because of discrepancies and inaccu-
racies, with much detail being impossible 
to check or verify. Missing persons, which 
is a continuing problem, and the tendency 
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of political actors to overestimate num-
ber of victims on their side or their ethnic 
group, have been particular problems.  As 
a result, Bosnia and Herzegovina only has 
estimates of wartime combatants and casu-
alties, while the exact number of those that 
participated as soldiers, in after the war 
recognised armies, is not known. Regard-
ing the total number of human casualties, 
Zwierzchowski and Tabeau (2010: 16) es-
timated number of 104,732, of which 35% 
of the victims were civilian and 65 % were 
military. Furthermore, they remark that this 
could be an overestimation of military vic-
tims because some military records includ-
ed persons that were never in active com-
bat, for example recording wartime deaths 
of personnel of the Ministries of Defence, 
police forces and employees of the army 
related production sector. Also, some fami-
lies were allowed to register deaths of their 
family members as military because of pre 
or post war associations of the deceased or 
family member with the army or the gov-
ernment. This was all done for the purpose 
of claiming war veteran family benefits. 
Upon signing the Dayton Peace Agree-
ment in 1995 and under supervision of inter-
national community, namely Office of the 
High Representative and the NATO Mis-
sion to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the pro-
cess of demilitarisation started immediately 
and consisted of several stages. The Dayton 
Peace Agreement envisaged two separate 
armies, one in each entity. In the Federation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina the army would 
have two ethnic components – Bosniak and 
Croat. The first wave of demilitarisation 
was based on the entity governments’ deci-
sion from 1998 to downsize their armies by 
30% between 1999 and 2001. Another wave 
commenced in 2002, when some 10,000 
soldiers were made redundant in the Fed-
eration, while in Republika Srpska most of 
demobilised soldiers were retired. In 2003 a 
state Law on Defence was adopted, which 
was the precondition for the establishment 
of a state level Ministry of Defence and for-
mation of a state B&H army. This process 
was preceded by the closure of the entity 
Ministries of Defence and disbandment of 
entity armies by the end of 2004. The whole 
process of defence reform was followed 
by gradual downsizing, which was sup-
ported by generous benefits for demobilised 
soldiers and preferential treatment of war 
related beneficiaries, such as veterans and 
ex-combatants with disabilities. As a result, 
demobilised soldiers became the responsi-
bility of the social protection system, de-
spite the fact that majority were of working 
age and fit to work. 
SOCIAL PROTECTION 
SPENDING AND TARGETING
Social policy and the system of social 
protection in Bosnia and Herzegovina is 
organised in accordance to the Dayton 
Constitution, embedded in Annex IV of 
the Dayton Peace Agreement. Annex IV 
gave central state institutions very limited 
decision making competencies (i.e. for-
eign policy, customs, foreign trade, etc), 
while defence1, economic and social policy 
are not explicitly mentioned, so that these 
competencies are automatically delegat-
ed to the entities. The Republika Srpska, 
which is centralised, and the Federation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where many 
competencies are exercised through 10 
cantons2, have most of the decision making 
1  Competencies for defense from entity to state level were transferred as precondition for establishment of state 
Ministry of Defense and joint B&H Army forces in 2004 and 2005 respectively. 
2  Each administrative level in the country has executive, legislative and judicial power.
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competencies in areas of social protection, 
economy and the labour market. 
The system of social protection in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina was comprehen-
sively developed during socialist period 
on the Bismarckian tradition. In the post-
Dayton period the system was adapted to 
the new administrative organisation of the 
country. Its main components are a sys-
tem of social insurance organised at the 
entity level, while non–contributory social 
benefits administered by entity, cantonal 
and municipal levels are an auxiliary, but 
very important, component. The system 
of social insurance includes pensions and 
disability insurance, health insurance, un-
employment insurance and, additionally 
in Republika Srpska, insurance for child 
protection. Social insurance is based on an 
employment contract and payment of so-
cial insurance contributions by employers 
and employees. Non-contributory benefits 
in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzego-
vina are financed from the entity, cantonal 
and municipal budgets, and from entity and 
municipal budgets in Republika Srpska. It 
is important to note that the system of so-
cial benefits in the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina is completely decentral-
ised, so each canton develops independent 
social policy related to non-contributory 
benefits. As a consequence of this, con-
solidated government expenditure on so-
cial assistance in the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina is only estimated, while 
in Republica Srpska this is not the case be-
cause the system is centralised. 
Despite one of the highest social con-
tribution rates in the region (amounting in 
total to 42,85% of gross salary), social in-
surance funds in the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina operate with financial dif-
ficulties. This is due to insufficient revenue 
collected through social insurance contri-
butions, as a result of a low level of em-
ployment and tax evasion (under reporting 
of salaries and unregistered work). On the 
other hand, social insurance funds are faced 
with a constant increase in the number of 
beneficiaries. In addition, as it will be ex-
plained later, certain rights granted through 
social insurance schemes that should had 
be financed from government budgets con-
tributed to accumulation of debts.
The system of social protection was 
devised to function well under conditions 
of stable and high employment. However, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in the post war 
period has never reached its pre-war em-
ployment level, which had its peak during 
the few years before the war3. It has been 
noted by many (Puljiz 2008, Zrinscak and 
Stubbs 2009, Woodward 1995) that social-
ist society was marked by a dualism, where 
the ruling elite developed a clientelistic re-
lationship towards state owned factory em-
ployees, technocrats, war veterans and civil 
servants as they were the main beneficiar-
ies of the social protection system. Dualism 
persisted in post-Dayton Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, but new political elites now have 
new clientelistic groups. Civil servants 
are the only old lobbying and clientelistic 
group that survived the transition (see ICG 
2010; ESI 2004). Old war veterans that 
took part in the liberation movement of the 
Second World War mostly kept their privi-
leges, but these are relatively modest and 
very limited compared to benefits of war 
veterans and demobilised soldiers from the 
most recent war. 
With regard to non-contributory social 
benefits, Keil (2011:47) asserts that because 
of the territorial and policy decentralisation, 
3  In 1989 Bosnia and Herzegovina had 1,085,300 employed, while in post Dayton period the highest number of 
employed was at beginning of 2009, 729,207. In additional, high unemployment rates, unregistered work and high 
inactivity rates especially among women, are characteristic of labour markets in both entities.
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the different nationalist parties in power 
in the cantons and in the Republika 
Srpska were able to implement a policy 
that favoured their national group while 
discriminating against all other groups. 
This is made possible by designing benefits 
based on status, a principle that survived 
socialist times. It enabled social transfers to 
be directed to those that do not necessarily 
fall into low income groups. 
Looking from aggregate level for the 
whole country, veterans’ rights and benefits 
dominate the social protection systems in 
both entities. The table below combines 
data from both entities and gives an over-
view of the total non-contributory social 
expenditure in the country.  The table 
shows that the share of ordinary or civil-
ian benefits is substantially lower than war 
veteran benefits. 
Table 1  
Expenditure on non-contributory social benefits in Bosnia and Herzegovina, expressed 
as percentage of GDP 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Civilian benefits 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.8 1.5 1.4 1.4
War veteran 
benefits 3.1 3.0 2.8 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.5
Total as % 
BDP-a 4.0 4.0 3.8 3.4 4.1 3.9 3.9
Note: Nominal 
GDP in millions 
of KM
13,736 14,505 15,786 16,928 19,106 21,641 22,831
Source: Estimate done by Central Bank of B&H and World Bank Office in B&H; Taken from World Bank 
(2009), Social Assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Creation of sustainable system based on real needs, 
page 9. 
In Federation of Bosnia and Herzego-
vina, approximately two thirds of all non-
contributory benefits, a substantial propor-
tion of the overall expenditure financed 
from the entity level, are directed to war 
veterans. Other social assistance benefits 
financed from the entity level absorb ap-
proximately one quarter of the total spend-
ing of non-contributory social transfers. 
These include two rights-based disability 
programmes, the civilian victims of war 
and the so-called non-veteran disability 
benefits, that absorb the largest share, while 
the smallest allocation is for means tested 
social assistance benefits administered by 
Centres for Social Work in municipalities 
(World Bank, 2009)4. However, it should 
be noted that the share of civilian benefits 
would be even smaller if we would group 
the civilian victims of war with the war 
veterans. Indeed, their status is also war 
related as well as their relatively generous 
benefits5. It should also be noted that part of 
non-contributory social transfers related to 
war veterans are directed towards pension 
funds to finance rights not based on contri-
4  Bartlett (2013: 18) estimates that for the traditional function of social assistance for the poor and socially 
excluded is allocated a mere 1.2 percent of GDP or thereabouts.
5  The civilian victims of war have almost the same kind of benefits as war veterans but those beneficiaries 
receive only 70% of the amount received by respective war veterans.
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butions (i.e. privileged pensions and other 
benefits). 
Despite significant fiscal transfers for 
non-contributory social benefits the World 
Bank (2009) and IBHI (2013) reports based 
on Household Budget Surveys for 2007 
and 2011 respectively warn that their cov-
erage of the poor is very low. In fact, they 
state that these transfers are regressive in 
nature, which means that a higher share of 
the overall expenditure of these benefits 
goes to people in the richer quintiles of 
B&H’s population. Moreover, veteran re-
lated benefits are the most regressive, with 
27% of veteran-related benefits going to 
people in the richest quintile of the popu-
lation, while those in the poorest quintile 
receive less than 15% of veteran related 
benefits (the World Bank, 2009). However, 
as Bartlett argues (2013: 20) the distribu-
tion of benefits looks very different accord-
ing to whether the basis of comparison is 
pre-transfer consumption or post transfer 
consumption. Namely, the World Bank 
(2009) and IBHI (2013) analysis is focused 
on post transfer consumption and we do not 
know what would be distribution of house-
hold consumption without benefits. Indeed 
some war veteran benefits are so high and 
it is not surprising that war veteran ben-
eficiaries belong to highest consumption 
deciles. 
Moreover, the World Bank (2009) and 
IBHI (2013) estimate that without the 
transfers the relative poverty incidence, 
which for 2007 is 18% and 2011 is 17.9%, 
increases only slightly to 19.2% and 19.6% 
respectively. Hence, the transfers reduce 
poverty incidence by only 1.2 percentage 
points for 2007 and 1.7% according to 
2011 survey data. This proves that non-
contributory social transfers have a negligi-
ble impact on poverty reduction. 
VETERANS’ BENEFITS IN 
FEDERATION OF BOSNIA AND 
HERZEGOVINA
When looking into war veteran legisla-
tion in the Federation of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, this area is complex and difficult 
to understand for someone not familiar 
with the way it evolved. This legislation in-
cludes numerous laws and by laws enacted 
at the entity and cantonal level granting nu-
merous rights and benefits, such as grants 
and low interest loans to buy apartments 
or cars or to start a business; privileged 
pension eligibility; special unemployment 
benefits6; payment for holders of military 
honours, etc. Hence, it is clear that war vet-
eran benefits as part of overall social pro-
tection system are under responsibility of 
both entity and cantonal governments. On 
the entity level the prime responsibility for 
war veteran policy lies within Ministry for 
War Veterans and Disabled Soldiers. How-
ever, most war veteran legislation includes 
rights that are under responsibility of other 
ministries – for example Ministry of Health 
and Ministry of Labour and Social Policy 
for disability status and pension rights re-
spectively. As most war veteran legislation 
is cross sectorial, its drafting is usually re-
sponsibility of cross sectorial group tasked 
by the government, which relies on expert 
civil servant contribution from other rele-
vant ministries, but where senior civil serv-
ant from Ministry of War Veterans has the 
lead role. Often these work groups include 
members of war veteran associations or 
they are at some point instructed to consult 
with them and consider their demands. The 
remainder of this article will present only 
one segment of war veteran benefits, name-
ly privileged pensions in the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
6  Special unemployment benefit to demobilised soldiers was granted from January 2007 (for maximum of three 
years, depending on military service) by Law on the Rights of Demobilised Soldiers and Their Family Members. 
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Currently rights to privileged pensions 
are granted by the Law on Early Privi-
leged Pensions (Official Gazette FBiH, no. 
41/2013). The law was developed by the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 
Inter-sectorial Working Group, formed in 
June 2011, and composed of civil servants 
from the Ministries for Veterans, Labour 
and Social Policy and Finance, together 
with two officials from the entity’s pension 
fund. The working group was tasked by the 
entity government to encompass into new 
law earlier enacted legislation that regulat-
ed this area, which was by decision of Fed-
eration B&H Constitutional Court declared 
unconstitutional (U-40/10 of 05.04.2011)7. 
Prior to the Constitutional Court’s Deci-
sion the system of privileged pensions con-
sisted of three government decrees and two 
laws that were introduced to facilitate the 
reform of the B&H military. This legisla-
tion provided early retirement options for 
a large number of military personnel and 
civil servants working for the entity min-
istry of defence that would otherwise be 
made redundant and left without jobs or in-
come. Furthermore, the legislation granted 
additional benefits to army volunteers, war 
veterans and families of fallen soldiers. As 
a result of this at the time of writing, the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina has 
more than 29,000 privileged pension ben-
eficiaries8. This number does not include 
beneficiaries who have, in the meantime, 
satisfied conditions for regular pension 
entitlement – at least 65 years old and a 
minimum of 20 years pension insurance 
contributions. These beneficiaries, in most 
cases, are no longer counted as privileged 
pensioners because their pension is being 
transferred to be paid from general revenue 
collected through contributions.  
Prior to enacting the new law on early 
privileged pensions and in accordance with 
the decrees and laws previously in force, the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina had 
approximately 21,000 beneficiaries, whose 
pensions were administered by the entity 
Pension Fund. The entity government had 
an obligation to finance these entitlements9. 
Table 2 gives an overview of the number 
of beneficiaries and amounts paid for privi-
leged pensions from 2004 to 2008. Since 
at the time the entity government allocated 
insufficient funds for financing these en-
titlements (amounts shown in the fourth 
column), the entity Pension Fund financed 
them from its general revenue, i.e. pension 
and disability contributions. This practice 
clearly implied a misuse of Pension Fund 
revenues that, according to legislation, 
should be used strictly for payment of reg-
ular pensions and Pension Fund’s running 
costs. 
An impartial reader unfamiliar with 
B&H politics and system of social protec-
tion would be puzzled why the pension 
fund paid benefits for which they did not 
have sufficient funds. The answer to this 
question lies with Pension Fund manage-
7  Constitutional Court ruled out that Decrees were unconstitutional because they were enacted by FB&H 
government and not by Federation of B&H legislative bodies (House of Representatives and House of Peoples), who 
are responsible for regulating social policy and social protection. 
8  Apart from this group, Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina has 354,244 pensioners, eligible on the basis of 
Pension and Disability Act.
9  In November 2009, Federation B&H government changed Decree no. II and no. III with regard to financing. 
They halved its obligations by 50%, stipulating that remaining 50% will be financed by entity pension fund from 
military pension contributions (regulated by Article 126 of Federation of B&H Pensions and Disability Act) that are 
calculated only administratively (hence, these contributions do not go to a separate fund). However, according to 
FB&H Pension Fund official military pension contributions had been insufficient to finance all required expenditure, 
so the Fund has been taking money to finance this expenditure from ordinary pension contributions. 
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ment board nominated by entity and can-
tonal governments, whose members are 
responsible for determining the so-called 
‘pension coefficient’10. Payment of the first 
privileged pension benefits started in 2004. 
This was preceded by a proposal by the 
Pension Fund Director and Deputy Direc-
tor to enact the same pension coefficient for 
privileged pensions as for regular pensions, 
which was adopted by the management 
board. Since the decision on the payment 
coefficient was not based on the availability 
of funds, this resulted in the running down 
of the Pension Fund’s reserves and debt ac-
cumulation, as shown in Table 1. The debt 
level had its first peak in 2008, due to the 
sharp increase in number of beneficiaries 
resulting from changes to Decree Number 
III in May 2008 and prior to local elections 
that took place in October 2008.  
10  It is pension entitlements multiplier introduced by Changes of Pension and Disability Act imposed by Office 
of the High Representatives in 2000 (so called parametric reform). The appliance of pension coefficient is supposed 
to balance pension funds expenditure with its revenue and therefore prevent accumulation of debt. 
Table 2 
Overview of number of privileged pension beneficiaries, total amount paid for their 
pension benefits and incurred debt (amounts given in local currency KM*)
Year
Number of 
beneficiaries 
of privileged 
pensions in 
December
Total amount 
paid for privileged 
pensions
Total amount of 
funds received 
from entity 
budget
Incurred debt for 
paid privileged 
pensions
2004 2,611 9,247,519.67 0.00 9,247,519.67
2005 4,533 28,349,016.07 2,230,850.00 26,118,166.07
2006 4,619 29,663,077.76 2,230,850.00 27,432,227.76
2007 8,373 43,414,355.56 71,833,334.00 - 28,418,978.44
2008 16,542 115,977,503.55 68,980,057.00 46,997,446.55
Total government debt 81,376,381.61
* 1 Euro is 1.95KM
Source: Federation BiH Pension Insurance Fund.
Furthermore, at the end December 2008 
entity parliaments passed changes to Pen-
sion and Disability Insurance Act, which 
came into effect on 1stJanuary 2009. These 
changes were mainly related to the harmoni-
zation of this law with other relevant entity 
legislation. However, the proposed changes 
to the law, as developed by a working group 
composed of civil servants from Ministry 
of Labour and Social Policy, Ministry of Fi-
nance and experts from Pension Fund, pro-
posed reaffirmation of Article 51 that stipu-
lates a balancing of pension expenditure 
with pension revenue explicitly for privi-
leged pensions. Experts from the Pension 
Fund strongly insisted on this. However, the 
Article was not agreed by the entity’s House 
of Representatives, following lobbying by 
senior civil servants from the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Policy, who clearly acted 
in support to preserving the status quo. Nev-
ertheless, a proposed amendment to Article 
94 was passed unnoticed, which stipulates 
government’s financing of earlier granted 
rights for members of the B&H Army, the 
Croatian Defense Council and police forces 
during the 1992-95 conflict that their years 
of service are counted double for the pur-
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poses of calculating pension insurance11. 
It is relevant to mention that contributions 
for the war years were never paid and, in 
practice, the application of this provision 
meant earlier retirement for those (mostly 
men) who could obtain proof that they were 
members of the armies mentioned during 
the war. Changes to Article 94 finally rec-
ognized these benefits as a budget liability 
as, prior to these changes, benefits incurred 
on this account were financed from pension 
and disability insurance contributions. By 
the end of 2009 about 78,000 veterans in-
voked this provision, creating a new obliga-
tion of the entity budget towards the Pen-
sion Fund of 71 million KM (IMF, 2010). 
As a result, the total Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina entity Pension Fund debt 
by the end of 2009 was 180,979,871 KM 
(1.2% of GDP).
Recognition of the debt was the subject 
of a court case that confirmed the existence 
of the debt accumulated for financing privi-
leged pensions (Federation B&H Pension 
Fund Director that pressed charges against 
the government resigned from the position 
soon after). With the objective of regulating 
this matter, a law on payment of the Fed-
eration B&H government debt for the en-
tity pension fund was passed in 2013. The 
law stipulated that the debt should be repaid 
over period of 10 years in 120 monthly in-
stalments staring in 2013.
The table below provides data related to 
age groups of privileged pension beneficiar-
ies from 2009. It clearly shows that some 
are very young, being aged below 40, while 
most are between 45 and 60. Therefore, the 
majority of privileged pension beneficiar-
ies are below the qualifying age of 65 for 
regular old age pensions stipulated by the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 
Pension and Disability Act. 
11  For instance, for someone who spend 3 years in an army during the war, those years are counted as 6 years 
of pension insurance.
Table 3 
Prividge pension beneficiaries by age group and gender in 2009. 
Age group
MEN WOMEN TOTAL
Number of 
beneficiaries %
Number of 
beneficiaries %
Number of 
beneficiaries %
25-29 1 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.0
30-34 194 1.0 0 0.0 194 1.0
35-39 860 4.6 6 0.6 866 4.4
40-44 1,594 8.5 70 7.5 1,664 8.5
45-49 3,209 17.2 147 15.8 3,356 17.1
50-54 4,009 21.5 185 19.8 4,194 21.4
55-59 5,365 28.7 158 16.9 5,523 28.2
60-64 2,392 12.8 135 14.5 2,527 12.9
65-69 331 1.8 48 5.1 379 1.9
70-74 124 0.7 23 2.5 147 0.8
75-79 92 0.5 39 4.2 131 0.7
80-84 213 1.1 58 6.2 271 1.4
85 or more 242 1.3 49 5.3 291 1.5
Unknown 36 0.2 15 1.6 51 0.3
Source: Federation B&H pension and disability fund, taken from Obradovic, N. (2010), “Pension and 
Disability Insurance in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Prospects for Pension Reform”, mimeo.
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Furthermore, most privileged pen-
sion entitlements are substantially higher 
than regular pension entitlements. For in-
stance, in 2014 the average regular pen-
sion was 364KM, while the average pen-
sion granted on basis of Law on Service in 
Military Forces B&H is 1,055.89KM, and 
485,44KM for pensions granted under the 
Law on Early Privileged Pensions12.
Anecdotal evidence indicates that many 
of the beneficiaries of privileged pensions 
have jobs or own businesses, while at the 
same time drawing pension entitlements. 
An ICG Report (2010: 18) quotes a Fed-
eration of B&H official who estimated that 
50% to 70% of veterans receive social ben-
efits illegally and 80% work, but remain 
registered as unemployed for free health in-
surance. The estimate that most war veter-
ans and ex-soldiers that receive benefits are 
working is not surprising given that most 
of them are of working age. Moreover, the 
high prevalence of unregistered work and 
the large grey economy makes it easy for 
anyone wishing to work informally to do 
so. In could be argued that the entity gov-
ernment’s policies actually encourage un-
registered work and the growth of the grey 
economy, rather than combatting them.  
Furthermore, the granting of pension 
rights to people that are not of pensionable 
age and without work-related disabilities, 
diminishes the main principles of a Pay As 
You Go pension system that rests on the 
principle that the working age population 
finances the retirement of those that are old 
or with disability. Not surprisingly, the IMF 
in its Country Report of 2010 alludes to the 
Federation’s privileged pensions as a ‘Tro-
jan horse’, suggesting that it could destroy 
the entity pension fund. 
Faced with a constantly increasing 
number of beneficiaries, whose financing 
has stripped entity budgets and led to insta-
bility, while at the same time facing the ef-
fects of the world financial crisis from late 
2008 that reduced exports and decreased 
the public revenues, the government re-
quested its first loan from the IMF. The 
IMF’s loan conditionality included cutting 
spending on social benefits13, in particular 
for war veterans and people with disabili-
ties, who make up the largest social benefit 
group in the Federation of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina. As a result of this pressure, sev-
eral legislative changes were introduced, 
including a Law on Revision of Payments 
to War Veterans, which was passed at the 
end of 2009. However, the law stipulated 
only principles of audit, while all other im-
portant issues were left to bylaws. The plan 
was to audit all veteran related payments 
including rights to privileged pensions. Un-
fortunately, most of the legislative changes 
introduced as part of the requirements for 
the IMF’s Stand by Arrangement failed to 
reduce the entity government’s expenditure 
for the groups targeted.
The problem is that all enacted war vet-
eran legislation is based on notions of right 
and reward, rather than a demonstrable 
material need. Those rights are presented 
as entitlements for those who fought for a 
political or ethnic group and to whom the 
current political elites owe their privileged 
positions; thus, war veterans just demand 
their share of the rewards. Impeding these 
rights would be presented as impeding on 
the current political establishment. As a re-
sult, they are not questioned. Demands for 
reductions in spending on war veterans are 
always presented as a call for revision of 
beneficiaries and the need to distinguish 
between false war veterans that are abus-
ing the system, and the real, deserving war 
veterans. In addition, war veteran groups 
12 Pension entitlements for this group have been substantially reduced with adoption of new law in 2013.
13  See Bosnia and Herzegovina: Letter of Intent to IMF, from 16. June 2009.
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are also an important political lobby (Kiel, 
2011:49), which can to some extent explain 
subsequent failures of this process.
At the same time as the entities adopted 
some reform legislation demanded by the 
IMF, the state parliament changed the Law 
on Service in Military Forces on 7th Sep-
tember 2010. This was just prior to the gen-
eral election planned for 5th October. The 
amendments to the law included changes to 
Article 48, giving the Ministry of Defence 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina the power to put 
forward for early old age pension any sol-
dier who had spent at least two years up to 
1995 as a member of the Army of B&H, the 
Croatian Defence Council or the RS Armed 
Forces, and who was on 1st January 2010 
made redundant from B&H Armed Forces 
because it was not possible to extend his or 
her contract in line with the law14. 
Since entity pension funds have expe-
rienced difficulties in paying entity privi-
leged pensions, the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina Pension and Disability 
Fund only granted the new entitlements 
provisionally and made them conditional 
on receiving advanced additional alloca-
tions from central government to cover the 
additional costs. Since the law had been 
passed by state parliament, former sol-
diers protested in front of state parliament 
for days, as parliamentarians discussed the 
budget for 2011. The state Minister of Fi-
nance was adamant that the state budget did 
not have additional funds for this purpose. 
The protests continued throughout 2011 as 
a new government was formed, with the 
budget for that year endorsed only at the 
end of 2011. There were many attempts 
to seek agreement to finance these entitle-
ments from the state budget, but these were 
opposed by RS representatives (whose en-
tity pension fund had not recognised this 
state legislation). 
By early January 2012 it was clear that 
additional funding from the state budget 
would not be forthcoming. The Federation 
government passed a Decision to transfer a 
total of 1,400,000KM from the state elec-
tricity company (JP “Elektroprivreda BiH”) 
and public telecom operator (BH Telekom) 
to the entity Pension Fund to finance mini-
mal pensions entitlements for these benefi-
ciaries. The amendments made to the state 
Law on Service in Military Forces on 7th 
September 2010 were abolished 2012 in 
order to prevent the creation of additional 
privileged pensioners, especially as the 
state was unable to meet the financial im-
plications of its own legislative changes.
Ultimately, attempts to reform the privi-
leged pension component resulted in a Law 
on Early Privileged Pensions (Official Ga-
zette FB&H, no. 41/2013) that incorporat-
ed rights granted under previous legislation 
(three decrees and two laws) and granted 
additional rights to groups that were not 
earlier included. Hence, despite IMF’s loan 
conditionality, the number of privileged 
pension beneficiaries increased by approxi-
mately 9,000.
The threats of the privileged pension 
component to the contributory scheme are 
potentially significant. The number of war 
veterans and ordinary pensioners that took 
part in the war of 1992-95 as members of 
one of the armies and who could, there-
fore, double-count these years for pension 
purposes is likely to increase, potentially 
including all who fought. Thus, the gov-
ernment’s bill for financing Article 94 is 
constantly increasing as more people go-
ing into retirement are using this provision. 
Currently, the cost of financing Article 94 
in the Federation is over 9 million KM per 
month. 
The difficulties in meeting payment 
obligations related to privileged pension 
14  The law stipulates termination of Army contract upon reaching the age of 45.
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beneficiaries from the Federation budget 
are constantly increasing. In addition to 
increased expenditures, the pension fund 
revenues collected through contributions 
are also insufficient to finance current level 
of ordinary pensions granted under Federa-
tion B&H Pension and Disability Act. All 
pensions are paid with delays, which are 
likely to be prolonged in the future. Gov-
ernment and the Pension Fund officials are 
reluctant to admit that funds are insufficient 
and reduce pension entitlements. Nonethe-
less, there is always a temptation to squeeze 
the ordinary pensions in order to accom-
modate the financial demands of privileged 
pensions as war veterans’ pressure groups 
are more to be feared than old, feeble and 
underprivileged regular pensioners. 
Benefits that were initially conceived 
as temporary post- war assistance have 
become a systematic allocation. In addi-
tion, there is a growing evidence that these 
benefits are prone to abuse, based on fake 
claims, documents and witnesses (ICG, 
2010:18). It is known that medical boards15 
can be bribed to certify higher grade de-
grees of disability, and that faked documen-
tation and false witnesses have been used 
by many to claim benefits. All this was 
supported by political parties and veterans’ 
associations. Veterans associations receive 
grants from all levels of government on 
a regular basis and play a very influential 
role in the political arena. Often they are 
used by political leaders against their op-
ponents. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The system of social protection in the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina has 
been directed towards meeting the needs 
of those that were active in armies during 
the war, or were affected by war or rem-
nants of the war, while the needs of other 
social groups have been neglected and are 
of marginal interest to policy makers. Be-
cause of generous benefits provision and 
special ad hoc arrangements enacted to se-
cure elections support, the war veteran leg-
islation clearly shows connections between 
political parties in power and war veteran 
groups. Most legislation, which secures fi-
nancial benefits for these groups, is drafted 
and passed for short term political gain, in 
an ad hoc manner and without proper con-
sideration of the consequences, especially 
the financial cost. The latter may be due to 
the incompetence of civil servants and offi-
cials working on war veteran legislation, or 
to governments and parliaments who have 
little interest in knowing. 
Furthermore, war veterans are very 
well organised and their associations are 
financed by the government. Compared 
to them other social players are incred-
ibly weak and silent, especially the unem-
ployed, poor and marginalised. In view of 
the weak organisation and capacity of other 
social partners, the war veteran groups and 
groups of those affected by the war have 
become important pressure groups in the 
country’s political system. 
The Federation government’s expendi-
ture directed to war veterans’ benefits has 
destabilised the entity and pension fund 
budget. Without assistance from interna-
tional financial institutions, namely the 
IMF and World Bank, that provided loans 
and budget support the situation would be 
unsustainable. The pressure will persist in 
the future. On one hand, there will be the 
challenge of meeting the ever increasing 
15  Medical Boards are organised through Institute for Medical Examining in Federation of B&H (Institut 
za medicinsko vjestacenje FBiH) that does medical grading of disabilities for all social protection sectors, but in 
accordance with different rules depending of beneficiary’s status. Institute’s director is SDA Party official and 
member of one cantonal parliament, which is a clear example of conflict of interest. 
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demands from these war veterans’ pressure 
groups that are especially prominent prior 
to elections; on the other hand, there is a 
shrinking public budget and continued eco-
nomic depression. The most likely future 
scenario is likely to involve pressure to in-
crease government expenditure and debt in 
order to meet the needs of all social protec-
tion beneficiaries, including war veterans. 
A similar policy towards problems of this 
kind has been seen in the past, as no one 
in the government has had the courage to 
reduce benefits. Such a situation creates 
space for non-transparent bargaining be-
tween certain lobbing groups and govern-
ment and for making payments to some, 
while neglecting other beneficiaries. Such 
practices destroy the system and its cred-
ibility, intensifying mistrust by the public 
and beneficiaries and creating long-term 
negative effects for the system of social 
protection and governance in general. It is 
difficult to see how a state with such a bur-
den of non-transparent and discriminatory 
social policy making can be on the path to 
progress and development.  
Change will be difficult. It is unlikely 
that any reform of the social sector in the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina will 
lead to any significant changes, because 
leading political parties and war veterans’ 
groups, as their most loyal electorate, are 
not likely to loosen their grip over public 
financial resources, which sustain the cur-
rent political elites in power.  However, the 
creation of an impartial system of social 
protection that would function strictly in 
accordance with well-composed legisla-
tion, targeted to reduce poverty and address 
the social risks of those in real need, would 
break the chain of dependence. This would 
trigger positive changes in both the labour 
market as well as promoting the democrati-
zation of political system. 
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Sažetak
BRANITELJSKE MJERE U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI
Nikolina Obradović
Filozofski fakultet Sveučilišta u Mostaru
Mostar, Bosna i Hercegovina
U radu se razmatraju implikacije braniteljskih naknada na socijalnu politiku i fiskalnu 
održivost u jednom od dva entiteta Bosne i Hercegovine, Federaciji Bosne i Hercegovine. 
Autor nastoji obuhvatiti promjene tijekom vremena i povezati ih s procesom demilitari-
zacije, kao i s utjecajem i pritiskom braniteljskih udruga, što je rezultiralo mjerama koje 
pogoduju određenim grupama branitelja, često nauštrb  drugih korisnika i dugoročne odr-
živosti sustava. Socijalna politika i zakonodavstvo koje regulira status branitelja u Fede-
raciji Bosne i Hercegovine temelji se na statusu, što vladinim dužnosnicima daje prostor 
za značajne diskrecijske odluke o dodjeli sredstava. Time se destabiliziraju javne financije, 
dok se malo toga poduzima u borbi protiv siromaštva.
Ključne riječi: ratni branitelji, socijalna zaštita, povlaštene mirovine, Federacija Bosne 
i Hercegovine.
